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On 30 March 2015 the Australian Federal Government launched its “Re:think”
initiative with the objective of achieving a better tax system which delivers
taxes that are lower, simpler and fairer. The discussion paper released as part
of the “Re:think” initiative is designed to start a national conversation on tax
reform. However, inquiries into Australia’s future tax system, subsequent
reforms and the introduction of new taxes are nothing new. Unfortunately,
recent history also demonstrates that reform initiatives arising from reviews of
the Australian tax system are often deemed a failure. The most prominent of
these failures in recent times is the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT),
which lasted a mere 16 months before its announced repeal. Using the
established theoretic framework of regulatory capture to interpret publically
observable data, the purpose of this article is to explain the failure of this
arguably sound tax. It concludes that the MRRT legislation itself, through the
capture by the mining companies, provided internal subsidisation in the form of
reduced tax and minimal or no rents. In doing so, it offers an opportunity to
understand and learn from past experiences to ensure that recommendations
coming out of the Re:think initiative do not suffer the same fate.
INTRODUCTION
The influence and effect of industry power in the development of government regulation is a
well-known phenomenon.1 At times, the consequence of such power may be minimal but in the case
of the Australian Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT), which was a tax imposed on profits generated
from the exploitation of non-renewable resources, anecdotal evidence suggests that the effect was
catastrophic, ultimately leading to the repeal of the tax.2 The theory of regulatory capture proposes
that regulation is often “captured” and manipulated by those who are the subject of the regulation, in
this case, the mining companies which were subject to the MRRT. The purpose of this article is to
examine the nature and extent of regulatory capture in the design of the MRRT and its ultimate
demise. In doing so, it offers an opportunity to understand and learn from past experiences to ensure
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that recommendations coming out of the current Federal Government “Re:think” initiative,3 aimed at
achieving a “better tax system” that delivers taxes that are lower, simpler and fairer, do not suffer the
same fate.
The background to the MRRT is generally well known due to media coverage.4 On 1 July 2012
Australia introduced the MRRT, but a mere 16 months later, on 24 October 2013, the newly elected
Federal Government announced in a press release that it was to be repealed.5 The legislative repeal
subsequently passed through Parliament with the abolition of the MRRT from 1 October 2014.6 Both
the introduction and repeal of the MRRT were not without controversy; most notably the opposition to
its introduction and a lack of revenue raised. After a failed attempt by the Federal Government at a
Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT), the MRRT was developed in consultation with several of
Australia’s largest mining companies, including BHP Billiton, Xstrata and Rio Tinto. At the date of
introduction it was estimated that the tax would raise $13.4 billion in the first three years. However, in
the first six months after the introduction of the MRRT, only $126 million was raised and none of
Australia’s biggest miners had any liability to pay the tax. An estimate of revenue to be raised was
revised downwards numerous times and in the 2012-2013 Mid-Year Economic Fiscal Outlook the
figure for that year was estimated to be $2 billion net.7 Over the first two years it actually raised only
$300 million, or 3% of what was estimated.8
Despite the minimal revenue raised, a tax imposed on profits generated from the exploitation of
non-renewable resources is generally perceived by many as appropriate and grounded in sound policy
rationale. However, both the lack of revenue and the subsequent announcement to repeal the tax
indicates that in the case of the MRRT there was arguably a failure in the design and implementation
of regulation effectively executing that policy. The purpose of this article is to assess the reason/s for
that failure. It does so using an established theoretical framework of regulatory capture which
examines the process through which special interests affect State interventions. A longitudinal study is
adopted to examine the development of the MRRT from the initial proposal to impose a uniform
resource rent tax as part of the Review of Australia’s Future Tax System9 through to its repeal. In
doing so, evidence of the influence of the large mining companies is critically analysed to determine
the effect that key stakeholders had in the development of the legislation. In particular, the article
examines the influence (regulatory capture) the mining companies had in minimising the amount of
tax likely to be due and whether they had a role in determining the methodology for calculating a
miner’s liability. Ultimately, the purpose of this article is to determine whether regulatory capture
theory adequately explains the failure of the MRRT. To do so, the article investigates whether the
mining companies were opportunistic both in advice given to Federal Government and Treasury in the
development of the MRRT and its subsequent application of the valuation rules,10 and if so, the impact
of that opportunism. The results from this article will inform current debate concerning the
development of policy and regulation, particularly from a tax reform perspective.
3 Re:think – Better Tax System, Better Australia, Tax Discussion Paper, (Commonwealth Government, Canberra, 2015)
http://bettertax.gov.au/files/2015/03/TWP_combined-online.pdf.
4 See, eg, media coverage discussed in McKnight and Hobbs, n 2.
5 For the Exposure Draft and related information see: Australian Government, The Treasury, MRRT and Related Measures
Repeal (24 October 2013)
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2013/MRRT-and-related-measures-Repeal.
6 Minerals Resource Rent Repeal and Other Measures Bill (2013) [No 2].
7 Commonwealth Government, Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2012-13,
http://budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/myefo/html.
8 Cormann M (Minister for Finance) and Hockey JB (Treasurer), “Repeal of the Minerals Resource Rent Tax”, Joint Media
Release (18 July 2014), http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media/2014/0718-repeal-of-the-minerals-resource-rent-tax.html.
9 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, December 2009,
(2010).
10 Minerals Resource Rent Tax Act 2012 (Cth), s 85-5 contained the ability of mining companies to adopt market value as the
starting base for their assets rather than historical cost.This allowed a greater adjustment for the cost of assets held.
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part two outlines the policy rationale for a
resource rent tax highlighting the theoretical soundness of such a model. Part three considers existing
literature which attempts to explain the failure of the MRRT. Part four discusses the concept of
regulatory capture and explains the factors which contribute to the capture of the regulator by the
regulated. Part five, through a longitudinal study, then considers the events leading to the introduction
and ultimate demise of the MRRT legislation through the lens of regulatory capture theory. Finally,
part six concludes that regulatory capture theory is a possible explanation for the failure of the MRRT.
It concludes that the MRRT legislation itself, through the capture by the mining companies, provided
internal subsidisation in the form of reduced tax and minimal or no rents. Further, it argues that to
avoid such outcomes where sound legislative policy is proposed, future tax reform should be more
“capture” proof.
A CASE FOR TAXING ECONOMIC RENTS
A resource rent tax is a tax on the economic rent, or the profits in excess of normal market return, of
mining companies. A mining company will earn rents where the proceeds from the sale of resources
exceed the cost of exploration and extraction. This includes a rate of return to compensate factors of
production (labour and capital).11 As such, it must be stressed that a resource rent tax only applies to
the excess over normal returns. Rent taxes can be contrasted with other forms of tax such as an
income-based tax, normally in the form of corporate tax, or output-based tax, normally in the form of
royalties. There are numerous successful examples of a resource rent tax globally. Australia introduced
the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax in 198712 and many other jurisdictions impose a resource rent tax,
including both developed and developing nations.13 A tax imposed on profits generated from the
exploitation of non-renewable resources is generally perceived as appropriate and grounded in sound
policy rationale. Unfortunately, Australia’s recent MRRT is not an example of a success story.
Ultimately, a crude measure of the success of a tax is revenue raised. To this end, the MRRT is
measured as a failure. Both the lack of revenue raised and the subsequent repeal indicates that in the
case of the MRRT there was a failure in the design and implementation of regulation effectively
executing that policy.
Identifying the reasons for the failure of the MRRT is ultimately the purpose of this article. An
investigation into the failure of the MRRT through a lens of regulatory capture theory is premised on
the assumption that without such capture, a tax on economic rent is theoretically sound. That is, a
theoretically sound tax, which should have been a success, failed because of the capturing of the
regulator (in this case, the Federal Government) by the regulated. As such, it is necessary to
demonstrate at the outset that the MRRT was theoretically sound. For reasons explained below,
resource rent taxes are generally viewed as being more economically efficient and are better placed to
maximise government return than other forms of tax despite potentially higher administrative costs.14
For these reasons, there is, at least theoretically, a sound rationale for introducing a resource tax.
The fundamental concept of a resource rent tax is not new. The original resource rent tax model
was formulated by Brown in 1948.15 The “Brown” tax, as it became known, is a pure cash flow tax
11 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9.
12 Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 (Cth). The Act was passed by Parliament and made effective on
15 January 1988. At that time, PRRT applied to all offshore areas except Bass Strait and the North West Shelf. In addition, the
legislation applied retrospectively to exploration permits awarded on or after 1 July 1984, and recognised expenditures incurred
on or after 1 July 1979: Australian Government, Department of Industry, Innovation and Resources, The History of Petroleum
Resources Rent Tax,
http://www.industry.gov.au/resource/Enhancing/ResourcesTaxation/PetroleumResourceRentTax/Pages/PRRTHistory.aspx.
13 For a summary of these nations and the taxes imposed see: McLaren J and Chabal P, “Given the Fact that Australia Has Had
a ‘Petroleum Resource Rent Tax’ Since 1987, Why Should There Be Any Opposition to a ‘Mineral Resource Rent Tax’?” (2011)
6(1) JATTA 20 at 24-26.As they explain, this includes resource rent tax on petroleum and/or mineral extraction.
14 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9.
15 Brown EC, “Business-income Taxation and Investment Incentives”, Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essay in Honour
of Alvin H Hansen (Norton, New York, 1948) pp 300-316.
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which effectively involves the sharing of the profits and costs of mining projects, between government
and industry, in proportion to the tax.16 Variations of the original form have developed and the second,
better known, resource rent tax model is known as the Garnaut – Clunies-Ross resource rent tax.17
This model replicates the effects of the Brown tax but without a refund where entities incur losses.
Garnaut and Clunies-Ross first championed their resource rent tax in their 1975 article entitled,
“Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural Resource Projects”,18 and then in their seminal
1983 book entitled, Taxation of Mineral Rents.19 As Garnaut and Clunies-Ross explained more than
30 years ago, such a tax is theoretically sound for three reasons; its neutrality, its ability to attain a
return on State-owned resources, and its contribution to the promotion of distributional equity.20
The first and most obvious reason for the imposition of a resource rent tax is its neutrality. A tax
regime which is neutral is one which does not interfere with the decision-making processes of any
business. For example, an economically neutral tax would be one where the decision to invest is not
based on the cost of taxes imposed on either income derived or capital returned. The most compelling
reason for imposing a resource rent tax is arguably its neutrality and the fact that it will not affect
decisions of mining companies. This is because a tax on pure economic rent, or profits above a normal
return for that type of investment, does not distort production or investment choices. The mining
industry, because of the unique exploitation of non-renewable resources, enables mining company
owners to earn above normal profits (economic rents).21 Under ordinary circumstances and generally
where businesses are making above normal returns, economic rents attract new investment resulting in
an increase in supply and decrease in demand. In that case, there would be nothing to tax. However, in
the mining industry economic rents are maintained due to the finite nature of the resources.22 As such,
as already stated, neither production, nor investment decisions are (in theory) affected by a resource
rent tax and a well drafted tax should yield significant revenue.
The second reason for imposing a resource rent tax is its ability to attain a return on State-owned
resources. Mining companies are extracting and making profits from resources which belong to the
State and Territories and therefore citizens of those States and Territories.23 As such, a resource rent
tax is also seen as a reasonable way to charge a price or impose a cost on that private business for the
use of what many consider public property. Arguably, when permission is given by a government to
mine public resources, an asset which is owned by the people of the State is effectively sold. It is
therefore logical for the community in general to expect an appropriate return on government-owned
property where that government allows private firms to exploit Australia’s non-renewable resources.
While there are various means of charging for the use of public property, a resource rent tax is an
efficient way to ensure such a return. Prior to the MRRT, this had been achieved in Australia via the
less efficient State and Territory royalty payment regimes.
Associated with a resource tax being neutral, as well as being an efficient way of charging private
business for the use of public property, is the third reason for imposing a resource rent tax; the fact
that it may also be applied to promote distributional equity.24 Taxes are essentially a way for
governments to earn income and redistribute that income according to need. Individual income is
generally made up of both market income (earnings) and transfers from government with inequality in
16 Explanatory Memorandum to the Minerals Resource Rent Bill 2011 (Cth), paras 1.10-1.11.
17 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9.
18 Garnaut R and Clunies-Ross A, “Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural Resource Projects” (1975) 85
Economic Journal 272.
19 Garnaut R and Clunies-Ross A, Taxation of Mineral Rents (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983).
20 Garnautand Clunies-Ross, n 19.
21 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9.
22 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9.
23 It is however recognised that there is debate as to whether State and Territory ownership justifies a Commonwealth tax.
24 Garnaut R, “The New Australian Resource Rent Tax: The Resources Super Profits Tax” (2010) 8(4) Insights 2.
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total income in Australia generally growing in recent years.25 However, redistribution to minimise
inequality is often achieved via the tax and benefits system and a recent example of falling inequality
occurred with the household stimulus packages that we saw after the global financial crisis.26 A
resource rent tax is often viewed as a low cost means of collecting revenue from entities to be
redistributed via government spending programs.27 Not only is this a theoretically sound reason for
introducing a resource rent tax, but it is often seen as one of the practical implications of introducing
such a tax. For example, when the MRRT was introduced in Australia it was packaged with the
government’s policy to generate more superannuation savings for working families, lower tax for all
companies, especially small businesses, and investing in our future infrastructure needs, particularly in
the mining States.28
Despite the sound policy rationale for a resource rent tax being acknowledged for many years, as
well as the existence of the narrower but highly successful and accepted Petroleum Resource Rent
Tax, the origins and rationale for the implementation of a broad-based resource rent tax in Australia
only really began with the release of a 2010 Report known as Australia’s Future Tax System Review
(AFTSR).29 Until the MRRT, Australia had not seen the introduction of a specific tax regime aimed at
capturing the economic rents of mining companies.30 Instead of such a regime, State and Territory
Governments imposed royalty schemes which simply involved a charge on production. However, as
the AFTSR was a comprehensive review with an aim to improve the equity and efficiency of the
Australian tax system, and address future challenges, the review panel was able to consider a resource
rent tax which it defined in their final report as “a tax that applies to the super normal profits, or
economic rent of a resource project”.31 The Report specifically said:
The current resource charging arrangements imposed on non-renewable resources by the Australian and
State Governments should be replaced by a uniform resource rent tax imposed and administered by the
Australian Government that:
(a) is levied at a rate of 40 per cent, with that rate adjusted to offset any future change in the company
income tax rate from 25 per cent, to achieve a combined statutory tax rate of 55 per cent;
(b) applies to non-renewable resource (oil, gas and minerals) projects, except for lower value minerals
for which it can be expected to generate no net benefits. Excepted minerals could continue to be
subject to existing arrangements if appropriate;
(c) measures rents as net income less an allowance for corporate capital, with the allowance rate set at
the long-term Australian Government bond rate;
(d) requires a rent calculation for projects;
(e) allows losses to be carried forward with interest or transferred to other commonly owned projects,
with the tax value of residual losses refunded when a project is closed; and
(f) is allowed as a deductible expense in the calculation of income tax, with loss refunds treated as
assessable income.32
As part of the recommendations, it was also suggested that the Australian and State and Territory
Governments should negotiate an appropriate allocation of the revenues and risks from the resource
25 GINI Growing Inequalities Impacts, Research, http://www.gini-research.org/articles/research. These findings are supported
globally: OECD, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (2011)
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/dividedwestandwhyinequalitykeepsrising.htm.
26 GINI, n 25.
27 This does however need to be weighed against potentially higher administrative and compliance costs associated with resource
rent taxes.
28 Rudd K, “Stronger, Fairer, Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future”, Media Release (2 May 2010)
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FKSQW6%22.
29 Commonwealth Government, n 9.
30 The Petroleum Resource Rent Tax, on offshore oil and gas deposits, has been in place since 1987 and has raised in excess of
$1 billion in revenue per year: McLaren J and Chabal P, n 13, at 20.
31 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9, p 743.
32 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9, Recommendation
46.
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rent tax.33 Ultimately, as Goodman and Worth say, the recommendations of the AFTSR were not only
consistent with sound policy thinking but also reflected the views of many that members of Australia’s
mining industry were positioning themselves to retain “much of its windfall gains under the resources
boom”34 and were ensuring that rents accrued to private entities rather than government.35 It was
apparent that the Australian public believed that private mining companies were not paying a suitable
fee for the use of finite public resources. It seems that it can also be assumed that the Australian public
viewed the charging of a resource rent tax as a suitable way to collect revenue for the purposes of
income redistribution.
In response to the AFTSR, the Labor Government under the leadership of Kevin Rudd announced
the introduction of the Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT). This announcement was made in a joint
Press Release by Prime Minister Rudd and Treasurer Swann, on 2 May 2010 and, with minor
modifications, reflected the review’s recommendations, including a rate of 40% on the “super” profits
made from “the exploitation of Australia’s non-renewable resources”.36 The RSPT was to replace
crude oil excise and provide a refundable credit for royalties mining entities paid to the States and
Territories.37 This was one of the few, of the 138 tax reform recommendations, adopted from the
AFTSR.38 At this time, it seemed that, with the introduction of the RSPT, sound policy would prevail.
However, ultimately the RSPT failed to come to fruition.
In the place of the RSPT, and under the leadership of Julia Gillard, the MRRT was introduced.
However, there were significant differences between the originally proposed tax and the ultimately
introduced tax. The MRRT reduced the resource rent tax rate of tax from 40% to 30% and allowed a
major uplift in offsetting costs by permitting use of market value of mining assets, as well as reducing
the tax base to include only iron ore and coal. As previously noted, after a short period of operation,
the MRRT was deemed a failure and less than two years later a third Prime Minister, Tony Abbott,
repealed it. Very little revenue was raised from the MRRT39 and, while market conditions played a
role in this, most of the blame lies with the design of the tax itself. In particular, the ability of mining
companies to adopt market value as the starting base for their assets rather than historical cost
constituted a major design flaw in the legislation.40 Essentially, this increased the allowances to
mining companies and so reduced the base upon which the tax was calculated. Australia’s three largest
mining companies, BHP Billiton, Xstrata and Rio Tinto all played a part in the design of the
legislation. The question remains as to how the mining companies were able to influence the
legislators to ensure this outcome. Previous studies offer some insight.
UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE MRRT
Several original approaches to understanding the design, implementation and/or failure of the MRRT
have been undertaken and need to be examined prior to a discussion on the thesis of this article and
the regulatory capture aspects of the MRRT. These earlier studies, to some degree, all focus on the
political aspects of the tax and the response of the Federal Government throughout the process.
33 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9, Recommendation
48.
34 Goodman J and Worth D, “The Minerals Boom and Australia’s ‘Resource Curse’” (2008) 61 Journal of Australian Political
Economy 201 at 212.
35 Goodman and Worth, n 34 at 212.
36 Sanyal K and Darby P, “Resource Super Profits Tax”, Australian Parliamentary Research Papers: Budget Review 2010-11
(2010) http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/
BudgetReview201011/ TaxationRSPTax#_edn1.
37 Sanyal and Darby, n 36.
38 Different figures have been reported.For example, Hockey stated 3 were accepted, http://www.joehockey.com/media/media-
releases/details.aspx?r=48; while Abbott and Robb stated 2.5: http://www.andrewrobb.com.au/Media/BrowseCategories/tabid/
81/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1071/Joint-Press-
Conference-with-The-Hon-Tony-Abbott-MP-and-The-Hon-Joe-Hockey-MP.aspx.
39 Cormann and Hockey, Joint Media Release, n 8.
40 Minerals Resource Rent Tax Act 2012 (Cth), s 85-5.
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However, at the outset, it should be noted that their focus is either on the strong political flavour of the
process of introduction or on the regulator as the investigated entity.
The most politically focussed articles offering insight into the failure of the MRRT are those by
Passant. Passant, in his article entitled, “Lessons from the Recent Resource Rent Tax Experience in
Australia”,41 argues that tax policy and tax law are a reflection of the balance of class forces and their
combativeness at any time in any given society. Without explicitly stating so, his thesis touches on
many of the aspects of regulatory capture theory discussed below. This is particularly apparent in his
discussion on the advertising misinformation campaign run by the mining industry. In a second article
entitled, “The Mineral Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of
Change”,42 Passant argues that the “poor health” of the MRRT was due to the nature of the Labor
Party as a capitalist workers’ party and the shifts in power and influence within its material
constitution.43 Commenting on the negotiation required to adopt the recommendation of the AFTSR
that the State and Territory royalty systems be replaced with a uniform resource rent tax, Passant states
that “neither the Rudd Labor Government with its proposed RSPT nor the Gillard Labor Government
with its MRRT had the strength of working class or other political support to negotiate this outcome or
impose it on the States and Territories”.44 The significance of Passant’s contribution is his explanation
as to how the mining companies were able to so effectively capture the government of the day. He
concludes that “the shift in the balance of class forces to capital societally and in the ALP means that
one of Labor’s traditional roles of imposing solutions on sections of capital for the benefit of all
capital is being undermined”.45 Essentially, Passant is arguing that the MRRT, because of the failings
of the government of the day, also failed to meet the theoretical objectives of imposing a charge on
private business for the use of public resources. In turn, this led to a failure of distributional equity.
Kraal and Yapa also consider the political aspects of the resource rent tax but claim to adopt
stakeholder theory with a grounded theory methodology to address the question of whether the
Australian Government was effective in the law reform consultation process for the proposed MRRT
in relation to the valuation approach for starting base assets.46 In their article, entitled, “Resource Rent
Taxes: The Politics of Legislation”,47 they conclude that the Australian Government lacked
effectiveness in the consultation process. They then provide recommendations centred around ways to
improve the law reform consultation process including: all submissions being made public; terms of
reference that require adequate support for positions taken in submissions tendered; and a genuine
invitation to consult.48 Interestingly, the article adopts a non-traditional view of stakeholder theory
treating the Australian Government as the “firm” with only those entities which made submissions to
the Policy Transition Group regarded as stakeholders. Arguably, theorists of traditional stakeholder
theory would find flaws in such an approach.
Stakeholder theory traditionally argues that anyone with the capacity to affect or be affected by
the “firm” is a stakeholder. Consequently, those parties would also be considered part of the
investigation. Unfortunately, by limiting the stakeholder group to one particular stakeholder, as Kraal
and Yapa do, there is an underlying assumption that this is the only group that “really counts”49 and
therefore it is that group for which value should be created. By this logic, the MRRT should be
41 Passant J, “Lessons from the Recent Resource Rent Tax Experience in Australia” (2011) 10 Canberra Law Review 159.
42 Passant J, “The Minerals Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of Change” (2014) 27(1) ARJ 19.
43 Passant, “The Minerals Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of Change”, n 42.
44 Passant, “The Minerals Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of Change”, n 42 at 22.
45 Passant, “The Minerals Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of Change”, n 42 at 31.
46 Krall D and Yapa P, “Resource Rent Taxes: The Politics of Legislation” (2012) 27(3) ATF 485.
47 Krall and Yapa, n 46.
48 Krall and Yapa, n 46 at 512.
49 Freeman R, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010) pp 52-63.
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regarded a success if those parties which made submissions to the Policy Transition Group50 managed
to influence the “firm” and value was created for them. This is exactly what happened, yet many
commentators, academics, economists and ordinary citizens, for a range or reasons, regard the MRRT
as a failure. The reason for this is the fact that the stakeholders were actually a much broader group
than those who made submissions and in fact extended to all citizens of Australia. Applying traditional
stakeholder theory to the MRRT suggests that a thesis would propose that the tax should create value
for all Australians and in this sense the MRRT was, in fact, a failure.
In a second article, entitled, “A Grounded Theory Approach to the Minerals Resource Rent
Tax”,51 Kraal states that she generates theories to provide explanations from contextual elements,
conditions, and events, which have an effect on the success of a new tax. Kraal argues that her
research “contributed to an understanding of the politics of tax policy and the practical implementation
issues, which apply to the introduction of a new tax. It also adds to the literature on the institutional
and social factors that affect tax reform”.52 As with most literature which adopts a grounded theory
approach, it is difficult to distinguish between the claim of four separate theories and what are actually
observations,53 the fourth of which is most relevant to this article. Kraal’s fourth theory is as follows:
“Unexpected pressures from deliberately staged intervening events and/or conditions can interrupt the
acceptance or perception about the benefits of a new tax with powerful effects. The consequences of
unfunded projects from a failed tax can be fatal for a Government.”54 Arguably, this theory is more in
the form of a proposition which can be tested. Applying regulatory capture theory to a longitudinal
study of the introduction process of the MRRT, as this article does, allows such a proposition to be
examined through an established explanatory lens. In this sense, it arguably tests Krall’s proposition.
Finally, Ergas and Robson have also commented on the failure of the MRRT. Their approach and
explanation is broader than a merely political explanation as they tend to focus on why the MRRT, in
the form introduced, failed to satisfy any economic rationale and distorted investment decisions. Ergas
and Robson, in their article entitled, “Revenue Allocation under the MRRT: Economic Aspects”55
conclude that “for reasons that are now well known, this has been a poor quality policy process; it has
led to a tax that is substantially distorting, both in itself and through its lack of sensible integration
with the tax system of the resource States”.56 Much of their argument centres around the failure of the
policy process in relation to cooperation with the States which, in turn, meant that the MRRT was not
sound on a long term basis.57 Their study provides useful insight into the ultimate failure of the
legislation itself but does not, in any detail, address the factors which led to what they consider a
flawed tax. It is this gap that the current article seeks to address.
In contrast to the studies discussed above, which either have a strong political focus or assess the
failure of the MRRT by investigating the legislator, the current study focuses on the behaviour of both
the regulated and the regulator with an attempted explanation as to how the regulated, that is the
mining companies, were able to “capture” the regulators (in this case, at first instance the Federal
Government) to ensure a favourable outcome. It does so using an existing theoretical paradigm, that of
50 The Policy Transition Group received 88 submissions which were predominantly from mining companies and their
representative bodies.A list of stakeholders who made submissions can be found in: Australian Government Policy Transition
Group, Issues Paper: Technical Design of the Minerals Resource Rent Tax, Transitioning Existing Petroleum Projects to the
Petroleum Resource Rent Tax and Policies to Promote Exploration Expenditure (2010)
http://www.afr.com/rw/2009-2014/AFR/2011/03/29/Photos/63db24fe-59b2-11e0-97d4-8027ac18ece0_PTG_issues_paper.pdf.
51 Krall D, “A Grounded Theory Approach to the Minerals Resource Rent Tax” (2013) 28 ATF 841.
52 Krall, n 51 at 844.
53 McKerchar explains that grounded theory requires a researcher to build a theory derived or “grounded” in the views and
observations of the participants: McKerchar M, Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thomson
Reuters, Sydney, 2010) pp 96-97.
54 Krall, n 51 at 866.
55 Ergas H and Robson A, “Revenue Allocation under the MRRT: Economic Aspects” (2012) 14(2) JAT 183.
56 Ergas and Robson, n 55 at 200.
57 Contrary to current economic thinking, Ergas and Robson also believe that taxing super profits are of themselves distorting.
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regulatory capture theory, to attempt to explain the failure of the MRRT. Currently, there is a gap in
the literature explaining the failure of the MRRT from any existing theoretical paradigm and while
there may be other theories which can account for the failure, for the reasons explained below,
regulatory capture theory would seem the most suitable. As such, using publically available
information, such as government reviews, discussion papers, public submissions, government
department documents and newspaper commentaries, the failure of the MRRT is re-examined through
a regulatory capture lens. Prior to this re-examination, the theory of regulatory capture is explained.
REGULATORY CAPTURE AND THE MINING INDUSTRY
Economists, lawyers and political scientists have developed several theories which attempt to explain
government economic regulation. Capture theory, or regulatory capture as it is more commonly
known, is one theory that attempts to do this. Often, this is described as the Stigler-Peltzman approach
to the economics of regulation.58 In its narrow form, capture theory attempts to explain why
government economic regulation exists, arguing that regulation is initiated by participants in a
particular market who are seeking the protection of government. The theory then postulates that once
regulation is in place, various government bodies are created to administer the regime with the running
of the administrative bodies undertaken by existing participants. As such, over time the interests of the
industry are served rather than the general public. In essence, this narrow interpretation describes
regulatory capture specifically as “the process through which regulated monopolies end up
manipulating the state agencies that are supposed to control them”.59
In its broader form, capture theory is seen as a type of government failure, as it describes the
behaviour of private interests in exerting considerable influence over government to advance their own
agenda, that is, the regulator (in this case, the Federal Government as ultimate controller of the tax
system) is captured by the regulated.60 The lobbying system is arguably one of the most obvious ways
in which regulatory capture occurs.61 This is because lobbying parties, through exposure to regulators,
are able to present their perspective of the situation and develop a level of sympathy from the
regulators.62 The regulated are also usually powerful market players who have, over the years,
developed sophisticated strategies for dealing with regulators. Dal Bo states that “according to the
broad interpretation, regulatory capture is the process through which special interest affect State
intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as diverse as the setting of taxes, the choice
of foreign or monetary policy, or the legislation affecting R&D”.63 It is capture theory, in this broad
sense, which is used in this article to attempt to explain the reason for the Federal Government retreat
from the RSPT to a “watered down” and ultimately unsuccessful MRRT.
Stigler first discussed the modern conception of the theory of economic regulation in 1971.64 His
theory was designed around the concept that “the central tasks of the theory of economic regulation
are to explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of regulation, what form regulation will take,
and the effects of regulation upon the allocation of resources”.65 While the central thesis to his article
is that regulation is generally acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit, the same theory can explain regulation which imposes obligations on industry such as taxes.66
58 See, eg, Dal Bo E, “Regulatory Capture: A Review” (2006) 22(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 203.
59 Dal Bo, n 58.
60 Dal Bo, n 58.
61 Zetter L, Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion (Harriman House, United Kingdom, 2011).
62 Zetter, n 61.
63 Dal Bo, n 58 at 203.
64 Stigler G, “Economic Theory of Regulation” (1971) 3 Bell J Econ 3.
65 Stigler, n 64 at 3.
66 Stigler, n 64 at 3.
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His theory ultimately integrates political behaviour with economic analysis.67 Interest groups are able
to influence regulatory outcomes through their support offered to the regulators (politicians).68
At the same time that Stigler published his theory, Posner also published his article entitled,
“Taxation by Regulation”,69 which explored the regulatory process through a distributive and
allocative lens arguing that “one of the functions of regulation is to perform distributive and allocative
chores usually associated with the taxing or financial branch of Government”.70 He was not discussing
taxation as we generally think of it, but rather the fact that regulation often involves internal
subsidisation.71 It may be argued that the MRRT legislation itself, through the capture by the mining
companies, provided internal subsidisation in the form of reduced tax and minimal or no rents.
Posner subsequently published his article on “Theories of Economic Regulation”72 in which he
discusses both public interest theory and capture theory as explanations for government intervention in
the market.73 Public interest theory cannot be dismissed in this article, as taxation regulation is, at
least theoretically, one of the purest forms of legislation introduced for the public interest.74 Taxation
is one of the most powerful means of redistribution. However, as Posner points out, “a serious
problem with any version of public interest theory is that the theory contains no linkage or mechanism
by which a perception of the public interest is translated into legislative action”.75 To that end, he
places greater emphasis on capture theory concluding that “the general assumption of economics that
human behaviour can best be understood as the response of rational self-interested beings to their
environment must have extensive application to the political process”.76
Peltzman’s historical narrative on the economic theory of regulation highlights the main points of
capture theory which are relied on for the purposes of this article.77 In particular, the fact that political
actors are presumed to be self-interested maximisers78 and the distributional aspects of regulatory
decisions are fundamental features of the theory.79 He states that a “self-interested politician and
constituents exchange objects of utility – a price or entry certificate for votes and money – and what
matters to each actor is their wealth or utility, not the aggregate social wealth”.80 Also of relevance is
his observation as to group size by stating that “more generally, in any similar political contest
between groups of disparate size, the compact organised interest will usually win at the expense of the
diffuse group”.81 Collective action tends to occur by small groups which can make significant gains.82
Both media and academic literature have documented prior regulatory capture by the mining
industry. In the United States, media has raised questions about “tax breaks” given to the mining
industry which, since the 1980s, have seen increased deductions passed into Federal law despite being
67 Peltzman S (ed), Political Participation and Government Regulation (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1989) p 1.
68 Peltzman, n 67, p 1.
69 Posner R, “Taxation by Regulation” (1971) 2 Bell J Econ 22.
70 Posner, n 69 at 23.
71 The process by which an enterprise does not pay its own way and another party pays the cost of the activities.In the case of
mining companies, by not paying tax on the extracted resources, society as a whole pays.
72 Posner R, “Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 Bell J Econ 335.
73 Posner, n 72.
74 Posner, n 72.
75 Posner, n 72 at 340.
76 Posner, n 72 at 356.
77 Peltzman, n 67.
78 Peltzman, n 67 at 6.
79 Peltzman, n 67 at 7.
80 Peltzman, n 67 at 7.
81 Peltzman, n 67 at 8.
82 Peltzman, n 67 at 8.
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potentially in conflict with State law.83 Regulatory capture within the extractive industries has also
been observed in the financial accounting setting both in Australia and internationally and offers the
closest approximation to the type of capture observed with the MRRT. Australia was the first
jurisdiction to develop an accounting standard specific to the extractive industry. The standard was
developed in response to a survey84 of the accounting practices of companies in the extractive
industries which revealed considerable divergence in those practices.85 The subsequent standard was
developed specifically to reduce this divergence. The mining industry reacted by expressing its
dissatisfaction with the standard, particularly with respect to the requirements to expense
preproduction costs and engaged in an extensive lobbying campaign that saw these requirements
removed.86 Such a response is supported by international studies investigating similar regulation. For
example, Cortese in her investigation of the standardising of oil and gas accounting in the United
States through a regulatory capture theory lens concludes that the standard setting efforts failed
because industry constituents influenced (captured) the regulators.87 Also in an international
accounting standard setting, the influence of powerful players has been investigated to further reveal
regulatory capture by influential extractive industries constituents so that new standards simply
codified existing industry practice.88
Domestically, broader regulatory capture of the Australian mining industry, through the influence
of the participants in the industry, has also been observed. As Goodman and Worth note, government
policy for nearly two decades has been to deliberately facilitate expansion of the industry.89 They refer
to the Federal Government’s 1998 Resources Policy Statement90 as indicative of the type of regulatory
capture that occurred in the industry. In particular, this document provided a strategic framework for
Australia’s minerals and petroleum market emphasising high levels of certainty to investors and other
stakeholders, a highly competitive operating environment in an economic sense, and support for the
industry’s efforts to achieve sustained wealth generation through growth, innovation and enhancement
of the value of its output before export.91 While, this may be considered “good” policy by some, it
does not detract from the fact that it was the mining industry which influenced, or captured, the
government (the regulator) resulting in a favourable outcome for industry participants. Goodman and
Worth provide the example of the consequent deregulation of indigenous land rights and voluntary
environmental codes as confirmation of the capture of Australian Federal policy by the mining
industry.92 Of particular relevance to this article is their insight into the resources policy which existed
in terms of the distribution of mining rents. As they note, other jurisdictions had already established
savings funds for mining rents to ensure revenues were used in the long-term interest of a nation,
prevent the wastage of windfall rents and insulate against volatility.93 Australia failed to do so.
In the current article, the question remains as to the form of regulatory capture utilised by the
mining companies. It is suggested that there were two primary forms of influence which are
83 Damon A, “Steven Horsford Calls on Nevada Regulators to Close Mining Tax Loopholes” Las Vegas Sun (21 March 2011)
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/21/steven-horsford-calls-nevada-regulators-close-mini.
84 The survey was initiated by the Research and Technical Committee of the Australian Society Accountants.
85 Luther R, “The Development of Accounting Regulation in the Extractive Industries” (1996) 31(1) The International Journal
of Accounting 67.
86 Luther, n 85.
87 Cortese C, “Standardising Oil and Gas Accounting in the US in the 1970s: Insights from the Perspective of Regulatory
Capture” (2011) 16(4) Accounting History 403.
88 Cortese C, Irvine H and Kaidonis M, “Powerful Players: How Constituents Captured the Settling of IFRS 6, an Accounting
Standard for the Extractive Industries” (2010) 34(2) Accounting Forum 76.
89 Goodman and Worth, n 34 at 211.
90 Howard J (Prime Minister) and Parer W (Minister for Resources and Energy), Minerals & Petroleum: Resources Policy
Statement: A Framework for Sustainable Growth (Australian Government, Canberra, 1998).
91 Howard and Parer, n 90.
92 Goodman and Worth, n 34 at 211.
93 Goodman and Worth, n 34 at 211.
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demonstrated throughout the discussion below. First, the relationships formed between the mining
companies and various politicians leading to a sympathetic response and second, the extension of that
influence through a campaign to appeal to a broader societal group aimed at convincing the general
public that the MRRT was a detrimental tax despite the obvious fiscal benefits. In light of both the
regulatory capture theory model and prior studies supporting its application to the mining industry to
explain regulatory outcomes, this article now turns to the specific application of regulatory capture
theory to the MRRT. In doing so, it is argued that the fundamental reason for the failure of the MRRT
was the ability of the influential mining companies to “capture” the regulators because of political
instability, relationships formed and the public perception of the MRRT which was created. These
factors were achieved by the behaviour of Australia’s three largest mining companies: BHP Billiton,
Xstrata and Rio Tinto.
THE MRRT AND REGULATORY CAPTURE
As evidenced from the above discussion, for regulatory capture to take place, that is, for the regulated
to capture the regulators, certain factors must be present. Previous studies indicate that numerous
factors contribute to regulatory capture. Cortese94 summarises the factors as follows. From an industry
perspective, there will generally be complexity within the industry operating environment, along with
resources available for lobbying and employment opportunities for the regulator. From a regulator
perspective, there will generally be a reliance on industry information and expertise, a reliance on
industry resources and employment opportunities in industry. When these factors are combined with
information impactedness,95 lobbying pressure and revolving doors, we are likely to observe
regulatory capture manifested as the development of shared perceptions of industry problems and
solutions, development of regulatory predisposition to make decisions consistent with industry
preferences and regulatory actions that favour the relevant industry.96 By considering the
implementation and ultimate repeal of the MRRT in four distinct stages, this article demonstrates that
many of the factors needed to be present for regulatory capture to occur were in fact present in this
case. Also observed is the presence of a further factor, that of political instability. The four distinct
longitudinal stages of the overall resource rent tax regulatory capture process were: (1) Australia’s
Future Tax System Review and a call for broad tax reform; (2) the proposed resource super profits tax;
(3) the design and introduction of the MRRT, and; (4) failure and repeal of the MRRT. Each is
considered in turn.
Stage 1: Australia’s Future Tax System Review and broad reform
Much like the current Federal Government’s “Re:think” initiative designed to start a national
conversation on broad tax reform, AFTSR was also designed to be a comprehensive review of
Australia’s tax regime.97 This process of review commenced when the AFTSR Panel released their
first discussion paper entitled, “Architecture of Australia’s Tax and Transfer System” in August
2008.98 The discussion paper provided a comprehensive overview of the tax system as it then was,
with the findings supporting the need for tax reform. Broadly, the discussion paper indicated that there
were 125 taxes paid by Australians each year, with 90% of the tax revenue collected in 2006-2007
being derived from 10 taxes. The breakdown between Federal, State and Territory, and Local
Government was 99, 25 and 1 tax respectively. Following the release of the first discussion paper, the
AFTSR Panel called for public submissions, allowing two months for the first round and indicating
94 Cortese, n 87.
95 The phenomena of decision makers acting opportunistically when there is uncertainty or complexity and one group has more
information than another group.
96 Cortese, n 87 at 407. Cortese provides this information in diagrammatical form. As such, the information stated is a summary
of that diagram.
97 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR), Terms of Reference (Canberra, released
13 May 2008) http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/reference.htm.
98 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Architecture of
Australia’s Tax and Transfer System (Canberra, released 6 August 2008)
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Paper.aspx?doc=html/Publications/papers/report/index.htm.
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that this would form the basis for a consultation paper which would be released before year end. To
aid in the submission process, framing questions were released centered around the major challenges
facing Australia that needed to be addressed through the tax-transfer system, the features that the
system should have in order to respond to these challenges, problems with the current system and
reforms needed to address these problems.99
Approximately 500 submissions on various matters were received during this first round of
consultation.100 At this stage, the main party that had connections to the mining industry to make a
submission was the Minerals Council of Australia, which made a submission containing both broad
and specific suggestions.101 The Council’s broad suggestions included reducing the number of tax
bases used in the tax and transfer system, making the remaining tax bases as comprehensive as
possible and removing taxes on business inputs.102 The Council also argued that there should be
uniformity in tax rate structures and an allocation of tax revenue via an Intergovernmental Agreement
between Commonwealth, State and Territory, and Local Government levels in a way that more closely
reflected the spending responsibilities of each level of government.103 Relevant specific suggestions
related to the need for changes to mining royalties to be prospective in nature, lowering of the
corporate tax rate and a 20-year cap on the tax depreciation of assets with a long life.104 Of note is the
fact that the three major mining companies did not make public submissions in this initial round of
consultation. However, the subsequent consultation document, discussed below, indicates that
discussions were held with the mining industry.105
Following the submissions and discussions held with industry, professional and community
groups, the AFTSR Panel released their first consultation paper in December 2008.106 The consultation
paper identified what were considered key issues raised during the submission process. These included
globalisation, changing demographics, climate change and technological progress.107 Design
principles called for in the consultation paper included equity, efficiency, sustainability and policy
consistency. In terms of taxation of natural resources, the consultation paper identified the following
key messages from the submission process.108 First, there was a potential to increase revenue from
natural resources in the overall tax mix. Secondly, changes needed to apply on a prospective basis to
ensure stability in the industry and should only be made after a thorough consultation process with the
mining sector. Thirdly, profit-based arrangements may be preferable over ad valorem arrangements.
Fourthly, submissions from the mining sector also proposed more generous tax depreciation
99 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
(Canberra, released 10 December 2008)
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/ConsultationPaper.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Consultation_Paper/index.htm.
100 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR), Submissions up to 14 November 2008
(Canberra, released 14 November 2008) http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/submission.aspx?round=1.
101 Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Submission to the AFTSR (2008).
http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/submissions/pre_14_november_2008/Minerals_Council_Australia.pdf.
102 Minerals Council of Australia, n 101.
103 Minerals Council of Australia, n 101.
104 Minerals Council of Australia, n 101.
105 This is made clear in the summary of key messages from submissions in Australia’s Future Tax System Review:
Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper, n 99,
p 255.
106 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99.
107 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 17.
108 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 255.
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arrangements.109 As stated above, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the publically
available submissions came from mining companies. However, this summary provided in the
consultation paper indicates that discussions did occur. As a result of input from submissions, three
consultation questions were formulated by the AFTSR Panel:
1) When considering the appropriate return to the Australian community for the use of its
non-renewable resources, what relative weight should be given to the determinants of that return?
2) What is the most appropriate method of charging for Australia’s non-renewable resources, given
they are immobile but that Australia needs to compete globally for mining investment?
3) What is the role of the tax system in ensuring that renewable resources are used both sustainably
and efficiently?110
Consistent with the discussion in part two of this article, outlining the case for taxing economic
rents, the consultation paper specifically listed what it referred to as two significant justifications for
taxing natural resources differently from other factors of production. First, it highlighted the fact that
natural resources are assets that are taken to be owned by the community and the taxation by
government reflects one way of achieving a return for the community on its assets.111 Secondly, it
stated that natural resources can be sources of location-specific economic rent and taxing such rents is
efficient and avoids the economic distortions arising from taxing other factors of production.112 The
consultation paper went on to discuss perceived flaws in the existing royalty system, naming the rate
of increase not appearing to have been proportional to the growth in the operating profits of the
mining sector, as a significant problem.113
Subsequent to the release of the consultation paper a second round of submissions ensued. The
AFTSR Panel received over 900 submissions during this second round, which occurred between
December 2008 and April 2009.114 In March 2009, public meetings were also undertaken in each
major city and two regional centres, followed in April 2009 by focus groups in five capital cities and
three regional centres. In this round it appears that there were no public submissions made by either
the Minerals Council of Australia or the three major mining companies.
The Labor Government, led by Kevin Rudd, received the final report of the AFTSR Panel in
December 2009. However, it was not released to the public until 2 May 2010.115 The report
recommended that State royalties should be abolished and replaced with a uniform resource rent tax at
a rate of 40%.116 While admitting that this would provide a less stable revenue stream, the report
claimed that it would give back to the community a more appropriate portion of the profits from
non-renewable resources over time and would be less likely to distort investment decisions.117
As the previous discussion indicates, up to this stage there had been little input from the regulated
(taxed) group, meaning that there were no observable instances of regulatory capture. This arguably
meant that the broad recommendations met the criteria for sound economic policy. However,
conditions were ripe for regulatory capture – we had a complex industry operating environment,
109 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 253.
110 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 253.
111 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 254.
112 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 254.
113 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, Consultation Paper,
n 99, p 256.
114 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR), Submissions after 14 November 2008
(Canberra, released 1 May 2009) http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/submission.aspx?round=2.
115 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9.
116 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9, pp 47-48.
117 Commonwealth Government, Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTSR) Report to the Treasurer, n 9, pp 47-48.
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extensive resources available for lobbying and a reliance on the industry for information and expertise.
In particular, Australia was in the middle of a mining boom and had not entered into a recession after
the global financial crisis largely due to this boom. By mid-2009, there was substantial disaffection
with the Labor Party as a result of a number of policy issues, the most significant of which was the
delay to the planned emissions trading scheme. There was also significant disaffection with Kevin
Rudd’s autocratic leadership style within the government.
At this stage, we saw the beginning of a process of regulatory capture with increased media
reports flagging what were considered concerns of the mining industry. Interestingly, media reports
about the uniform resource rent tax began at the time the government received the report, meaning this
was happening several months before the report was publically available. The initial response to the
proposed uniform resource rent tax by society as a whole, and the mining industry in particular, was
reported in the media. Media reports soon suggested that a switch from State royalties to a resource
rent tax had the support of the majority of the Australian population.118 However, at the same time
reports also indicated that the mining industry did not think that their tax burden should be
increased.119 Mining companies voiced concerns that State royalties would not be removed and
therefore they would be paying tax twice. They warned that this would affect Australia’s
competitiveness.120 Specifically, it was reported that Mitch Hooke, Chief Executive of the Mineral
Council of Australia, indicated a concern that there would be a tax grab under the guise of tax
reform.121 The closer the time came for the report to be officially released, the greater the number of
media reports which indicated unrest in the mining community.122 As well as the mining companies,
the West Australian Premier, Colin Barnett showed his dissatisfaction with the Rudd Government by
further holding out on signing the health reform plan, with many linking the two.123 Arguably, the
mining industry, through the media, had begun a campaign to discredit the proposed uniform resource
rent tax even before it had been officially announced.
Stage 2: The official announcement of the Resource Super Profits Tax
The official announcement about the introduction of a RSPT came on 2 May 2010, when the then
Prime Minster, Kevin Rudd and Treasurer, Wayne Swan, released a joint press statement stating the
government’s long-term plan to apply a RSPT to the profits earned from non-renewable resources.124
In the same press release, it was stated that the revenue raised from the tax would be used to increase
superannuation, decrease the company tax rate and invest in infrastructure.125 State royalties were also
to be rebated as part of the tax package. Prime Minister Rudd and Treasurer Swan indicated that over
the following months’ consultations with industry, State Governments and the wider community
would continue in relation to tax policy.126 Treasurer Swan also established a Resource Tax
Consultation Panel which was chartered to undertake targeted consultation with industry and other
stakeholders. One of its specific objectives was to liaise with industry to “find the best way of
118 See, eg, Durie J, “Rent Charge on Miners a Good Work in Progress”, The Australian (3 May 2010).
119 Uren D, “Business Lobby Hits Tax-cut Priorities”, The Australian (23 December 2009) p 6; Mitchell A, “Resources, Going
Cheap”, The Financial Review (16 December 2009) p 54.
120 Stevens M, “Decision Threatens Investment”, The Australian (17 December 2009) p 19.
121 Tasker S, “Review Raises Fears of Double Tax Grab”, The Australian (18 December 2009) p 23.
122 Shanahan D, “Miners Face Billions in New Taxes – Rudd to Tap Resources States”, The Australian (24 April 2010) p 1;
Franklin M, “Mining Tax ‘will Kill Industry’”, The Australian (26 April 2010) p 2; Tasker S, “Mining Sector Warns on Rent
Tax”, The Australian (26 April 2010) p 19.
123 Burrell A, “The Raw Deal is a Rich Resource in the West”, The Australian (24 April 2010) p 13.
124 Swan W (Deputy prime Minister and Treasurer) and Rudd K (Prime Minister), “Stronger, Fairer, Simpler: A Tax Plan for
Our Future”, Joint Media Release (2 May 2010)
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/028.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year.
125 Swan and Rudd, n 124.
126 Swan and Rudd, n 124.
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achieving the Government’s policy outcomes and delivering a system that is both simple and
minimises compliance costs”.127 Tony Abbott, the then leader of the opposition, indicated that the
opposition would vote against the RSPT.
Following the announcement by the then Federal Government, lobbying on a large scale ensued.
From the very beginning, the Minerals Council of Australia claimed that the double taxation of mining
(State and Northern Territory royalties and the RSPT) would threaten both jobs and shareholder
wealth. At this stage, the large mining companies also entered into the discussion. Marius Kloppers,
Chief Executive Officer of BHP Billiton, claimed that the RSPT would threaten the country’s
competitiveness and jeopardise future investments.128 Sam Walsh, Chief Executive Officer of Rio
Tinto, announced that their expansion plans were on hold because of the proposed tax.129 In May
2010, BHP Billiton spearheaded a multifaceted and multi-million dollar advertising campaign
denouncing the RSPT. The campaign included media statements, public denouncements, and starting
on 7 May, full page advertisements in national newspapers. The advertisements specifically depicted
two graphs, the first showing the royalties paid by the mining companies over previous years, and the
second showing the “real” amount paid in tax, with the difference being that the second graph
included company tax paid.130 The message, which was meant to be delivered by these
advertisements, was that BHP Billiton was already paying its fair share of tax.
The Federal Government responded with its own advertising campaign. However, it was unable to
expend the same resources as the major mining companies.131 The government’s advertising campaign
was also seen as a “back flip” by the then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd as he had pledged prior to being
elected to reduce spending on government advertising if he became Prime Minister.132 In fact, Rudd
revised the rules governing publicly funded advertising campaigns seven weeks before he utilised the
exceptional circumstances clause to allow him to fund his rebuttal to the mining companies.133
Ultimately, he was able to do so under the clause regarding national emergency, extreme urgency or
some other compelling reason.134 There is also speculation that this was the cause for the delay
between the government receiving the AFTSR report and then releasing it on the same day as it made
the RSPT announcement, the suggestion being that the government expected backlash from the miners
and wanted to be able to retaliate immediately.
While the signs of regulatory capture were appearing in the media, the beginning of direct
consultation with the largest of the mining companies occurred on 4 June 2010. Documents released
by Treasury under freedom of information and subsequently posted on the Treasury website,135 reveal
127 Swan W, “Resource Tax Consultation Panel”, Media Release (2 May 2010)
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/029.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=.
128 Kloppers M, “BHP Billiton Disappointed with New Australian Mining Tax”, Media Release (2 May 2010) http://
www.bhpbilliton.com/home/investors/news/Pages/Articles/BHP%20Billiton%20Disappointed%20With%20New%
20Australian%20Mining%20Tax.aspx.
129 Stuchbury M, “Battlelines Drawn Over Chinese Mining Bounty – the Henry Review 2010”, The Australian (3 May 2010)
p 8; Franklin M, “Resistance to Tax Reform Strategy Growing”, The Australian (4 May 2010) p 1; Stuchbury M, “Mine the
Boom, Share the Loot”, The Australian (8 May 2010) p 12.
130 McKnight D and Hobbs M, “Public Contest through the Popular Media: The Mining Industry’s Advertising War against the
Australian Labor Government” (2013) 48(3) Australian Journal of Political Science 307 at 313.
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$38m War Chest: Poll”, The Australian (8 June 2010) p 4; Lee J, “How a $7m Advertising Campaign Saved a Fortune”, Sydney
Morning Herald (2 July 2010) p 1; Shoebridge N, “Canberra Gets the Message”, Australian Financial Review (3 July 2010) p 9;
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132 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The 7.30 Report: Labor Leader Kevin Rudd in the Hot Seat, Interview Transcript
(9 October 2007) http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s2054855.htm.
133 McKnight and Hobbs, n 130 at 311.
134 McKnight and Hobbs, n 130 at 311.
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an accurate picture of the capture. On that date, an email was sent by Gerard Bond, Project Director of
BHP Billiton, to Graeme Davis, Commonwealth Treasury, and copied to Xstrata, Rio Tinto and Anglo
American. It specifically discussed a meeting with the consultation panel set for 7 June 2010.
Mr Bond discussed his understanding of the purpose of the meeting. That is, that it would be a new
type of consultation, not limited by the same terms of reference as previous RSPT consultations.
Specifically, he asked that the following items be up for discussion: retrospectivity/sovereign risk,
competitiveness and practical difficulties of applying resource rent taxation to a diverse minerals
sector. The email also indicated that the mining companies were concerned that the consultation
should not be perceived as being private or secret and indicated that the panel should be aware that the
mining companies involved may choose to make the existence and content of the meetings public at
any time. Bond indicated that unless the above conditions were met the meeting should not go
ahead.136
While meetings were being held between the Consultation Panel and Australia’s largest mining
companies, the negative advertising campaign continued. In May 2010, Prime Minister Rudd declared
the campaign by the mining companies to be “a scare campaign funded by some very, very big vested
interests”.137 It was revealed that in a six-week period, the mining industry spent over $22 million
advertising against Rudd’s plan for an RSPT.138 Ultimately, the campaign contributed to the slump in
Labor’s electoral standing and the prompting of the party to replace Rudd with Gillard.139 On 23 June
2010, Kevin Rudd announced that a leadership election would be held the following day at the request
of Julia Gillard. Rudd had indicated that he would run however a few hours prior to the election he
resigned from his position and Gillard was elected Prime Minister unchallenged.
The newly elected Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, said that resolving the RSPT dispute with the
mining industry would be her first priority after being elected.140 She called for a truce with the
mining companies, promising to cancel the government’s mining tax advertising campaign and asking
the mining companies to do the same.141 The Minerals Council of Australia, Rio Tinto and BHP
Billiton suspended their advertising campaign.142 The media reported that the business community
were relieved with the change in Prime Minister as they believed Gillard was more likely to undertake
consultation with business groups.143 The mining companies also said that they were looking forward
to working with Gillard to find a solution to the RSPT, although there was skepticism that Treasurer
Wayne Swan would be willing to negotiate given the hardline he had taken previously.144
Passant summarises the demise of the RSPT and the consequence of the regulatory capture as
follows:
The mining companies’ backlash against the RSPT, as well as destroying a Prime Minister, destroyed
the grand expenditure dreams of one-third each of the estimated ten billion on company tax cuts,
one-third on infrastructure for the mining industry and one-third to cover the loss of revenue from
superannuation tax concession through superannuation guarantee increases. … The $22 million
advertising campaign by the Minerals Council of Australia was having an effect. [Gillard] introduced a
136 Australian Government, The Treasury, Released Document 66 (June 2010),
http://www.treasury.gov.au/Access-to-Information/DisclosureLog/2011/RSPT-and-the-MRRT.
137 News.com.au, Kevin Rudd Defends Mining Ads (29 May 2010)
http://www.news.com.au/national/kevin-rudd-defends-mining-ads/story-e6frfkvr-1225872937660.
138 Davis M, “A Snip at $22m to Get Rid of PM” (2 February 2011)
http://www.smh.com.au/business/a-snip-at-22m-to-get-rid-of-pm-20110201-1acgj.html.
139 Davis, n 138.
140 Australian Associated Press, “Mining Tax Haces One More Hurdle” (6 February 2012)
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142 Uren, n 119.
143 Hewett J, “Open War is Over, But How Business and Labor Make Peace Remains a Mystery”, The Australian (26 June
2010) p 5.
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much watered-down tax, the MRRT’. … This process of retreat was mediated through a troika of
politicians – new Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Treasurer Wayne Swan and Minister for Resources
Martin Ferguson – and a troika of the big mining companies – BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Xstrata. The
double troika agreed to the MRRT.145
While the RSPT had been abandoned, the third stage in the regulatory capture narrative involved
the introduction of a much watered down version.
Stage 3: The Mineral Resource Rents Tax
Gillard set a 1 July 2010 deadline for an agreement to be made with the mining companies. Adding to
the pressure was the fact that the mining industry had a new advertising campaign ready to go if
negotiations fell through.146 Negotiations were undertaken with the three largest mining companies
Rio Tinto, Xstrata and BHP Billiton.147 On the 30 June 2010 the BHP Billiton’s Gerard Bond sent an
email to Treasury confirming the design of the MRRT.148
Less than two weeks after becoming Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, together with Treasurer Wayne
Swan and Minister for Resources Martin Ferguson, released a press statement announcing that a
breakthrough agreement had been reached with the mining industry.149 This breakthrough was the
change from the previous RSPT to the MRRT. The major changes from the RSPT to the MRRT
included a reduction of the rate of tax from 40% to 30% and a reduction of the tax base to include
only iron ore and coal.150 Significantly, it was proposed that mining companies would be able to
choose book value or market value for the starting base allowance for the MRRT. These changes were
all proposed in the email of 30 June sent by BHP Billiton.151 The press release conceded that the new
tax was more generous to the industry in some respects but stated that the industry had given ground
in other areas. The number of companies to be affected by the tax dropped significantly from 2,500 to
320.152 The changes were thought to result in a decrease in revenue of $1.5 billion which meant cuts
in the associated income tax concession package had to be made. The company tax rate would be cut
to 29% but no further and the resource exploration rebate was scrapped.153 In the same press release,
it was announced that a Policy Transition Group, to be led by Minister for Resources and Energy
Martin Ferguson and Don Argus, (Former Chairman of BHP Billiton), would spearhead the
implementation of the MRRT.
While the MRRT did not generate the same negative media as the RSPT, there were still reports
that small to mid-size mining companies were displeased with the final result and felt that it heavily
favoured the big three.154 Andrew Forrest, Founder and Chairman of Fortescue Metals Group, stated
that the tax was “finalised in a shroud of secrecy and exclusiveness with the world’s biggest mining
companies”.155 The Minerals Council of Australia rejected claims that the tax favoured the larger
145 Passant, “The Minerals Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of Change”, n 42 at 27.
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http://www.treasury.gov.au/Access-to-Information/DisclosureLog/2011/RSPT-and-the-MRRT.
148 Kelly P, “Rescue Arrived Too Late”, The Australian (18 April 2012)
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Release (2 July 2010) http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/055.htm&pageID=003&min=
wms&Year=2010 &DocType=0.
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miners.156 There was also backlash when the government attempted to put a cap on State royalties that
would be rebated, keeping the rebate at the current level with no future increases.157 The Minerals
Council of Australia and major mining companies threatened to restart their advertising campaign and
the government backed down.158
The Policy Transition Group released a consultation paper in October 2010,159 and received 80
formal submissions in response before issuing their recommendations. However, as Passant explains:
The campaign of the mining industry saw the biggest three miners in Australia set the terms of the
design of the proposed MRRT. Their power and dominance over Labor was such that the industry not
only forced Labor to remove a Prime Minister and set the design parameters of a new tax. They were
able to set those parameters so restrictively that they and the rest of the mining industry will pay little
tax under the MRRT.160
Through these submissions, the mining companies were able to influence the design of the
legislation to minimise the amount of tax likely to be due via determining the methodology for
calculating a miner’s liability. This liability was calculated on the basis of mining profit less MRRT
allowances. One of those allowances is what is known as a starting base allowance, which allows a
miner to take into account investments in assets and certain expenditure on assets. There are two
valuation approaches to determining this allowance – the book value approach and the market value
approach – and the miner is able to choose which valuation approach to apply. However, a Treasury
Executive Minute sent to the Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer on 2 July 2010 (the day of the
press release announcing the agreement between the government and the mining companies) warned
that:
There will be a significant risk for the integrity of the MRRT under the market value approach:
• The approach will create strong incentives for mining companies to inflate the recorded value of
the assets to be included in the starting base; and
• Strong incentives will also exist to push the value implicit in the resources towards assets with
shorter effective lives (like earthworks) rather than to those with longer effective lives (like mining
rights).161
This was a significant difference between the RSPT and the MRRT and a significant concession
by the Gillard Government. It also explains why the estimated tax to be raised varied considerably
from actual tax raised.
In December 2010, the Policy Transition Group delivered its report to the Australian
Government.162 By mid-March 2011, the Gillard Government announced that they would accept all 94
recommendations and these recommendations would inform the exposure draft to be released
mid-way through the year.163 The Minerals Council of Australia made the same submission to both the
first and second exposure drafts focusing on areas where they felt that the exposure draft did not align
with the Policy Transition Group recommendations that the government had agreed to.164 They did not
challenge the core concepts of the tax. By the end of the year, the MRRT was introduced into
Parliament and passed the House of Representatives on 22 November 2011 and the Senate on
19 March 2012.
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Stage 4: Failure
The MRRT was implemented from 1 July 2012 but failed to bring in the expected revenues. At the
date of introduction it was estimated that the tax would raise $13.4 billion in the first three years.165
However, in the first six months after the introduction of the MRRT only $126 million was raised and
none of Australia’s biggest miners had any liability to pay the tax. An estimate of revenue to be raised
was revised downwards numerous times and in the 2012-2013 Mid-Year Economic Fiscal Outlook the
figure for that year was estimated to be $2 billion net. Over the first two years, it actually raised a
mere $300 million, or 3% of what was estimated.166 In 2013, a change in government saw Tony
Abbott become Prime Minister of Australia and he declared his intention to repeal the MRRT with
draft legislation for its repeal being released in October of the same year. The Mineral Resource Rent
Tax Repeal and Other Measures Bill (2013) was introduced to Parliament in June 2014.
It has been suggested that Treasury’s underestimation of the market value of the assets resulted in
a lower depreciation being factored into the revenue estimates.167 However, interestingly the market
value of the assets was provided to Treasury by the mining companies168 with the Secretary of
Treasury noting that the mining companies were under no obligation to advise Treasury of any change
in their original estimates.169 A mining executive noted that “estimates ‘naturally’ change over
time”.170 It would seem then that Treasury’s reliance on the mining industry to provide accurate and
current data which it had no obligation to do and which it failed to do was the cause of the
overestimation by Treasury as to the amount of revenue that would be raised. This overestimation
compared to the actual amount received contributed to the tax being viewed as a failure.171 This, along
with an election promise to repeal the tax, made it relatively easy politically for the new Abbot
Government to do so. The consequence was that, in effect, the mining companies, through constant
pressure, and by convincing the Gillard Government to allow market value to be used to value their
assets, followed by their reluctance to supply up to date information on that value, resulted in them
getting what they wanted – the repeal of the tax.
Politically, this was achieved because of the relative power of the mining industry. The Minerals
Council of Australia claims that the industry accounts for up to 8% of Australia’s GDP directly,
upwards of 20% of business investment and around 50% of national exports.172 In 2013, direct
employment in the minerals industry was 249,000 with indirect employment increasing those numbers
significantly. The Australian Bureau of Statistics indicates that the mining industry contribution to
GDP from 2005 to 2010 ranged from 7.2% to 9.8%, with its share of exports from 2006 to 2011
ranging from 36.8% to 55.4% and its contribution to the total value of Australia’s exports being more
than 50%.173 As Passant points out “The economic power that the mining industry has, and its
potential future profits from the massive reserves, translates into political power”.174
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately the MRRT was deemed a failure because it did not generate the forecast revenues. This
article has demonstrated that regulatory capture by the mining companies of the legislative process
was a possible cause of that failure. It would seem that the capture was most able to proceed because
of the haste with which the Gillard Government sought to mend relations with the mining industry.
Indeed, a senior Treasury advisor in correspondence with the Chiefs of Staff of both the Treasurer and
the Minister for Resources advised:
It is clearly in the national interest to conclude this matter quickly given the negative effect on economic
confidence caused by the miners public campaign against the RSPT. Accordingly my personal view is
conclude negotiations quickly even if that requires concessions providing that those concessions are
largely temporary.175
This research has identified that most of the factors for regulatory capture identified by Cortese,
complexity within the industry operating environment, resources available for lobbying reliance on
industry information and expertise and industry resources were present in the design of the MRRT.
There was however a further significant factor that came into play – the political instability both
within the Labor Party and the electorate. Completing the negotiations with respect to the original
RSPT and the introduction of the MRRT was a political imperative for the Labor Government. It was
facing an election within five months and at a time when it was suffering a public backlash. The Labor
Government had come into power in 2007. However, by mid-2009 there was substantial disaffection
with the Labor Party as a result of a number of policy issues, the most significant of which was the
delay to the planed emissions trading scheme. There was also significant disaffection with Kevin
Rudd’s autocratic leadership style within the government. By 2010 the opinion polls were routinely
suggesting that the Labor Party would not win the election due later in that year with Kevin Rudd as
Prime Minister. As a consequence it is fair to say that by early 2010 the Labor Government was in
trouble.
The outcome of this regulatory capture is that despite the AFTS Review being correct when the
final report stated that “given the size and value of Australia’s non-renewable resource stock and the
expected strength of commodity prices, it is important that the community receives an appropriate
return from the exploitation of its resources by private business”176 ultimately the political strength of
the large mining companies in Australia and the political instability both within the Labor Government
and the wider electorate meant that this has not occurred. This article has provided a fresh insight into
understanding the failure of the MRRT. Australia’s mining boom, while potentially slowing, has been
a success in terms of ensuring economic growth but Australian has not seen the benefits through the
tax system.
175 Australian Government, The Treasury, FOI Disclosure Log: Resource Super Profits Tax and the Minerals Resource Rent Tax,
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